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Education itself is a concept that has a standard or a norm that provides
education with its purpose. In education judgments of value are necessa-
rily implied. Most disputes about the aims of education refer to the dis-
tinction between two terms: educere (to lead out), and educare (to train).
To lead out requires that a student be treated as a person and with res-
pect, whereas to become educated is to learn to be a person. Training, on
the other hand, views students as »materials« to be poured into an adult
mould. The concept of training, unlike that of education, has no logical
connection with values. The paper examines the various procedures re-
quired to attain the virtue of knowledge. The use of authority, as a princi-
ple of the education procedure, implies inducing students to arrive at
conclusions which teachers themselves intend students to make, but
which are not necessarily demanded by the subject matter itself. Educa-
tion does not only reflect the social changes that have already occurred,
but must also play an active role in directing social changes. Hence, in-
doctrination and other rationalisations should be regarded as immoral
ways of treating students.
Key words: education, extrinsic and intrinsic values, learning, indoctrina-
tion, moral justification
Introduction
The role of education is not only to reflect social values, but also to
develop rationality, and avoid irrational and hence repressive social influ-
ences. The philosophy of education must, therefore, highlight the distinc-
tion between the coercive and the moral aspects of education. Obviously,
good or serious learners must learn certain things that are permanently
and universally applicable to man as such. In other words, any student’s
intellectual integrity and capacity for independent judgment springs from
the intrinsic meaning of education. Extensive knowledge does not refer
only to facts; it predominantly refers to the evaluative aspects of know-
ledge and, therefore, must involve personality as a whole. Autonomous
judgments become the precondition of the moral aspect of education
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since they do not aim at utility, but rather at what is good and therefore
right. Both the purpose and content of education depend on the political
view on the role of individuals in a particular society, and their readiness
to challenge indoctrination, propaganda and rationalisations.
Where does Education Stem from?
It is not uncommon that some philosophers of education strive to
provide a more or less static definition of education. Yet, any definition
that leaves out the social and political perspective of education, and that
matches only the scope of understanding and enhancing values of the in-
herited culture must be ideological! In other words, authoritarian regimes
have a very strong political interest in maintaining »static« moral ideals
generated by particularistic worldviews, and in giving priority to the goals
of specific groups. This is the reason why instrumental (extrinsic) values
are not clearly distinguished from profound (intrinsic) values. John Wil-
son from the Department of Educational Studies at Oxford University
also disagrees with those who claim that education has nothing to do with
politics! He claims that »such a definition of education is conservative,
and thus political.«1
Some modern philosophers of education – due to their obscure defi-
nition of educational goals – confuse the concept of upbringing (trophé),
child rearing and training with the concept of education (paideia). Obvi-
ously, an unclear perspective on the ultimate end of education lowers
one’s understanding of the above issue. Have we improved much on what
Plato and Aristotle said about departing from whatever is not virtuous in
education?
Both Plato and Aristotle overtly emphasise that the quest for cha-
racter-building and intellectual maturity must presuppose a certain moral
or political ideal. Plato identifies this ideal by clearly defining the term
education as follows:
»When we say that one of us is educated and the other uneducated, we
sometimes use this latter term of men who have in fact had a thorough edu-
cation – one directed towards petty trade or the merchant-shipping business,
or something like that. But I take it for the purpose of the present discussion
we are not going to treat this sort of thing as ‘education’; what we have in mind
is education from childhood in virtue, which produces a keen desire to be-
come a perfect citizen who knows how to rule and be ruled as justice de-
mands. I suppose we should want to mark off this sort of upbringing (trophé)
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1 Wilson, J. Preface to the Philosophy of Education, p. 48.
M. ¬itinski: The Concept of Education METODIÈKI OGLEDI, 12 (2005) 1, 81–94
from others and reserve the title ‘education’ for it alone. An upbringing di-
rected to acquiring money or a robust physique, or even to some intellectual
facility not guided by reason and justice, we should want to call coarse and il-
liberal, and say that it had no claim whatever to be called education. Still, let’s
not quibble over a name; let’s stick to the proposition we agreed on just now:
as a rule, men with a correct education become good.«2
Aristotle defines education in normative or moral terms by assuming
that education does not aim at utility whereas training does. In other
words, Aristotle’s moral ideal of education is rooted in the quest for de-
liberate autonomous choices, and has nothing to do with the non-moral
uses of value words (right, wrong, ought, must not, etc.). The difference
between the moral and the non-moral uses of value words occurs not be-
tween right and wrong, but between (instrumental) right and (moral)
right! Hence, instrumental right does not equal moral right, but moral
right does equal both instrumental and moral right! Moral reasons are not
something we find in the world; we rather impose them upon the world
through the construction of our knowledge3 and through our actions. For
Aristotle, education is a moral concept because it goes beyond instrumen-
tal right.
Aristotle’s view unfolds as follows: »The animals other than man live
by appearances and memories and have but little of connected experi-
ence; but the human race lives also by art4 and reasoning … yet we think
that knowledge and understanding belong to art rather than to experience,
and we suppose artists to be wiser than men of experience; and this be-
cause the former know the cause, but the latter do not. And in general it
is a sign of the man who knows and of the man who does not know, that
the former can teach, and therefore we think art more truly knowledge
than experience is; for artists can teach, and men of mere experience can-
not. … But as more arts were invented, and some were directed to the ne-
cessities of life, others to recreation, the inventors of the latter were natu-
rally always regarded as wiser than the inventors of the former, because
their branches of knowledge did not aim at utility.«5
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2 Plato. Laws, pp. 643–4.
3 In Kantian theory, if a judgment were analytically true, experience would not be
needed to justify its truth. Morality is concerned with practical questions – not with the ways
things are, but with the way things ought to be done! Since experience tells us only about the
way things are, experience does not provide answers to our practical questions!
4 Art should here be read as the expression of human creative talent.
5 Aristotle. Metaphysics, 980b 25–981b 20, pp. 689–690.
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Education is not a Fact but a Process
If human personality were defined in biological terms, people would
grow automatically! However, if human personality is defined in cultural
terms, people need education. Nevertheless, there are many disagreem-
ents on the content that people as autonomous and rational creatures are
logically required to obtain, should they wish to become educated. Wil-
son6 maintains that knowledge and understanding should be favoured be-
cause it is hardly possible not to be concerned with learning and the
objectives of learning while advocating what ought to be taught and
learned. Obviously, education must be a practical social activity, since it
presupposes two parties: educators and those who aim to get educated.
As a social activity, education is likely to reflect the ideology of the society
or group using it. It is, therefore, always required that its own values be
justified!
In transitional countries, the political and economic systems still play
a significant role in determining the ideological goal of their respective so-
cieties. The question is not whether education should take part in this
process, but whether the contribution of education would be irresponsib-
le, or would it be concerned with maximum intelligence in re-examining
the systems’ values and their implications.
Since learning requires time, becoming a person appears to be a mat-
ter of degree and a process. Each teaching and learning situation is the
personal creation of those who experience it; thus, if Howard Gardner’s
theory of multiple intelligences (published in 1983) were recognised, edu-
cation could change its format extensively. (Gardner outlines seven intel-
ligences:7 linguistic, logical-mathematical, spatial, musical, bodily-kina-
esthetic, interpersonal and intrapersonal). Dearden8 proposes that the
distinction between information and judgment is, in fact, a distinction be-
tween different manners of communication rather than a dichotomy be-
tween what is known. It springs from our reflection upon teaching and
learning, rather than from our reflection upon the nature of knowledge.
In other words, education has an instrumental potential to cause change
because its role is not only to reflect the values of society, but also to help
modify inappropriate practices! And as Sternberg9 rightfully admits, what
counts as a morally right action depends on the objectives!
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6 Wilson, J. Preface to the Philosophy of Education, p. 53.
7 Silverman, S. L., Casazza & Martha, E. Learning & Development – Making Connec-
tions to Enhance Teaching, p. 34.
8 Dearden, R. F. Instruction and Learning by Discovery, p. 170.
9 Sternberg, E. Just Business – Business Ethics in Action, p. 4.
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In spite of the fact that values are the result of both a socio-economic
background and education, values are never simple, biologically given
and indubitable entities. In his Introduction to the Aims in Education
Hollins10 assumes that values do not exist in vacuum waiting for an object.
What we desire depends entirely on what objects of desire have been pre-
sented to us. We learn to want things. Our desires have a history – not just
a biological, but also a rational, social history of intelligible responses to
what we have been offered. However, those who want to give the public
what they want the public to want fail to admit that unethical behaviour
arises from the internalisation of the values of the executives. »What is
lost in this is the concept of the criterion of autonomous critical taste, of
people who can defend themselves both, the advertisers and the educa-
tors.«
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Aspects of Education
Throughout the entire history of education educators have been con-
cerned with the formulation of the aims in education. If those aims were
determined implicitly, if they consisted of ambiguous and abstract terms,
then no empirical procedure could either falsify or confirm them!
As Richard S. Peters11 states, the conviction that educators must
have aims is generated by the concept of education itself, because to
speak about education is to commit oneself to a judgment of value. In this
respect, education is commonly considered valuable in extrinsic terms for
both individuals (they will get better jobs) and society (good citizens will
be developed).
However, education can also be conceived in intrinsic terms. In other
words, as Langford12 forges, in formal education two parties may be dis-
tinguished, one of whom, the teacher, accepts responsibility for the educa-
tion of the other. Informal education is defined negatively as education
that does not meet this condition. In such definitions the word education
itself is left undefined.
As indicated earlier,13 Aristotle forges the view that Wisdom emer-
ges from the knowledge of artists who seek the truth and meaning in a
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10 Hollins, T. H. B. (ed.) Aims in Education – The Philosophic Approach, pp. 7–8.
11 Rich, J. M. (ed.) Readings in the Philosophy of Education, p. 37.
12 Langford, G. & O’Connor, D. J. (eds.) New Essays in the Philosophy of Education,
pp. 3–4.
13 See footnote number 4.
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creative fashion, and thus the pressures of the necessities of life do not
influence their activity primarily. In other words, Aristotle’s scope of edu-
cation most certainly refers to the term educere (to lead out) because it
enhances one’s expertise and results in both self-development and the re-
alisation of one’s potentials – the goal of education is to learn to be a per-
son. Accordingly, good society will be a society of fully developed persons
with unique freedoms and responsibilities.
However, if we were to view education as if it stemmed solely from
the term educare (to train), then it would be, more or less, equivalent to
upbringing. Wilson14 exposes his idea of the difference between trained
teachers and educated teachers. In his view, both types of learning may
benefit both teachers and their pupils. The difference is rather that the no-
tion of education covers more ground, or takes more things into considera-
tion than the notion of training.
As Natale15 emphasises, theory and practice are never far apart or
separated – one is the corrective of the other. If a system’s values and
their implications were constantly re-examined, then the protests against
treating children as materials to be poured into an adult mould should be
the source of the permanent revision of the educational principles and
procedures. Regardless of which teaching and learning procedure (i.e.,
training, conditioning, rational explanation, etc.) is debated, one thing is
for sure – children should be treated with respect and as persons. If an
educator is not concerned with the growth of a child’s personality but de-
liberately instils his/her own beliefs in the child, (s)he behaves unaccepta-
bly! In other words, if educators use children as a means rather than treat
them as an end, their behaviour is unacceptable! Regardless of whether
such educators are or are not aware of their unethical practices, they
communicate incomplete and thus false and misleading information;




The only possible way that education can escape the misconception
of its purpose is by allowing its core assumptions to be challenged. Thus,
the ability to access, analyse, evaluate and communicate information in
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14 Wilson, J. Preface to the Philosophy of Education, p. 23.
15 Natale, S. M. Ethics and Morals in Business, p. 14.
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all its forms requires the educated to recognise whether half-truths have
been taught – instead of the whole truth – by having been given only one
point of view or by all the other possible points of view having been sup-
pressed. Such extensive knowledge goes beyond facts, and is the reason
why the acquisition of extensive knowledge cannot be the result of train-
ing alone! This idea is emphasised by Cornford, who asserts that Theaete-
tus is led to see that knowledge must be sought above the realm of mere
sensation or perception, somewhere in the field of thinking or judging de-
scribed as an activity of the mind by itself.16 Extensive knowledge is the
type of experience that has a profound evaluative character; it refers to
one’s understanding of the very nature of education itself, which is consi-
dered valuable in and for itself!
According to the fact that experience tells us only about the way
things are and not about the way things ought to be, extensive knowledge
must be the exclusive result of education! Or as Daveney17 states in his
paper on education, the fact that one is being trained for something does
not imply that one is being educated, the implication of which is that the
concept of training, unlike that of education, has no logical connection
with values. The difference between the two lies in the difference between
empirical facts and moral evaluations. Training is an empirical concept
divorced from moral values.
Educational aims cannot remain static; in order to facilitate the de-
velopment of rationality in children, the contents and methods of educa-
tion must be critically reappraised. According to Harris,18 education in-
volves personality as a whole, whereas training touches only the surface of
the mind. The danger of thinking about education in terms of static con-
tent is that the content of education could easily be confused with educa-
tion itself. Accordingly, teachers who concentrate on content rather than
on education instruct rather than educate.
Value judgments differ from all other kinds of judgment. Their valid-
ity depends on whether they are significant for the diverse range of pro-
found human interests, and not on whether they are well accepted in and
by a particular community. We cannot infer values. We can only discover
how people define them. Values are enduring and resistant to change be-
cause they are tied to fundamental human needs. If ethical judgments
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16 Cornford, F. M. Plato’s Theory of Knowledge – The Theaetetus and the Sophist of
Plato, (Theaetetus 187 A), p. 109.
17 Langford, G. & O’Connor, D. J. (eds.) New Essays in the Philosophy of Education, p. 84.
18 Harris, A. Thinking about Education, pp. 6–7.
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were simply conformity statements about particularistic worldviews, then
values would be arbitrarily invented, and it would be impossible to argue
about questions of value!
The job of evaluative statements is not only to express an agent’s
approval, but also to present his/her appraisal! Thomas E. Hill19 main-
tains that sensory and observational truth conditions shed little light on
the meanings of evaluative statements. Evaluative statements must rely
on a priori judgments, and are appropriate without reference to experi-
ence. Moreover, according to Searle,20 evaluative statements must differ
from descriptive statements; otherwise, they could no longer function to
evaluate. Normative concepts are irreducible to empirical concepts,
they simply constitute the way we conceive and justify our ethical ap-
praisals. The debate about what kinds of differences are ethically rele-
vant, and which values and principles are fundamental depends on the
right decision.
For Cornel and Daniels21 education is also a normative concept be-
cause, implicitly, education is conceptually connected with what is valu-
able. This means that the purpose of formal education is always directed
towards the shaping of values recognised by a particular political system.
Hence, education institutionalises social values and makes the socio-po-
litical aspects of a particular culture known. Unfortunately, in every soci-
ety education is sometimes dominated by irrational or repressive factors,
such as popular opinion, local prejudices and national demands. Authori-
tarian22 systems of education very commonly produce pupils who are ex-
tremely critical, but only of those who do not fully adhere to the accepted
beliefs, rules and modes of action.
Education and Indoctrination
Education covers a much wider area than indoctrination not simply
because education does not exclude other opinions from the evidence at
hand. Education implies the willingness »to detect nonsense, employ lin-
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19 Hill, T. E. The Concept of Meaning, p. 210.
20 Searle, J. R. »How to Derive Ought from Is«, in: Foot, P. (ed.) Theories of Ethics,
p. 110.
21 Hamm, C. M. & Daniels, L. B. »Moral Education in Relation to Values Educa-
tion«, in: Cochrane, D. B., Hamm, C. M. and Kazepides, A. C. (eds.) The Domain of Moral
Education, p. 17.
22 Passmore, J. »On Teaching to be Critical«, in: Peters, R. S. (ed.) The Concept of
Education, pp. 197–199.
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guistic clarity as a defence against their own and other people’s fantasies,
grasp what a conceptual question was and what sort of treatment it re-
quired, identify such questions in practice.«23
According to Patricia Smart,24 indoctrination occurs when evidence
is absent or insufficient for the degree of belief accredited to it – educa-
tors are concerned with offering reasons, whereas indoctrinators with
offering rationalisations. She concludes that if we are to avoid indoctrina-
tion, the beliefs we teach must be rational. Yet, rationality must imply
other possible alternatives so that the accepted beliefs can be subjected to
criticism and replaced by moral reasons and moral arguments. In other
words, whether propositions indoctrinate or not depends upon how far
we are prepared to allow their refutability.
The fundamental difference between educators and indoctrinators is
that the latter treat all rules as »inherent in the nature of things« and de-
ify the same as if rules preside beyond the reach of rational criticism. On
the other hand, however, educators welcome criticism and are clear about
what they are doing and – even more importantly – about what they are
not doing.
In all authoritarian schools, regardless of whether they are secular or
ecclesiastical, teachers believe themselves to be successful when their pu-
pils leave school holding certain beliefs so powerful that no future experi-
ence could shake them, so committed to certain behavioural habits that
any modification of them would induce overwhelming feelings of guilt.
(Their unquestioning obedience can be counted on.)
Wilson25 rightfully emphasises just how heavy the weight of responsi-
bility not to indoctrinate is on the teaching profession! According to him,
the teaching profession does not have the right to transfer its irrationality
to children since good teachers are not only the instruments of society,
but are also its leaders in some sense. Wilson proposes that although the
teaching of science or modern language can plainly be useful, they do not
develop and expand the pupils’ personality in the same way that the teach-
ing and discussion of the issues which people are intimately concerned
with – such as, discussions of their feelings, moral behaviours, religious
aspirations, practical choices, etc. – does.
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23 Wilson, J. Preface to the Philosophy of Education, p. 2.
24 Smart, P. »The Concept of Indoctrination«, in: Langford, G. & O’Connor, D. J.
(eds.) New Essays in the Philosophy of Education, pp. 38–42.
25 Wilson, J. »Education and Indoctrination«, in: Hollins, T. H. B. (ed.) Aims in Edu-
cation – The Philosophic Approach, p. 44.
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Richard Hare26 indicates that indoctrination begins when we try to
prevent the growth of our children’s capacity to think about moral ques-
tions for themselves. If the methods employed by education are used to
generate attitudes not open to argumentation – thus labelling the stu-
dents’ emergent thoughts as dangerous a priori – the methods are bad.
Why Education and Ethics must Interfere
Any given social order, including laws and customs, comprises social
rules, which represent the coercive aspect of what is regarded »as a good
life of the best possible life.« By contrast, the moral order of a society is
an order that, in fact, accomplishes the purpose of education by helping
people to self-develop. Every human being is capable of becoming mo-
rally autonomous. However, without formal education it is very difficult
to obtain an objective perspective for the judgement of events. Yet, phi-
losophers27 agree that one of the most important goals of education
should be the liberation of students from uncritical mental habits. They
cannot be expected to respect themselves as persons unless they have
learned to fully utilise the intellectual and creative powers with which
they are equipped.
In order to develop any firm stand against indoctrination or to be-
come aware of the distinction between ultimate morality and utilitarian
morality, everybody should aim at self-development. Consequently, what
emerges is the distinction between the coercive and the moral aspects of
education. Moral education can be established exclusively through en-
couraging analytical attitudes that distinguish descriptive from prescrip-
tive assertions. Moral autonomy is the fundamental criterion for the iden-
tification of what is good and thus right.
Dearden28 points out that in Kant the concept of autonomy is pri-
marily applied to individual persons. However, Kant’s notion of personal
autonomy also helps to combine personal autonomy with the logical
autonomy of the moral discourse, which social dynamics, in fact, consists
of. That is why the arguments about the purpose of education differ
widely in respect of the views on the type of society that ought to exist.
Harris29 presents an image of a primitive agricultural society, which com-
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26 Hollins, T. H. B. (ed.) Aims in Education – The Philosophic Approach, p. 52.
27 Lipman, M., Sharp, A. M. & Oscanyan, F. S. Philosophy in the Classroom, p. 62.
28 Dearden, R. F. »Autonomy as an Educational Ideal«, in: Brown, S. C. (ed.) Philoso-
phers Discuss Education, p. 3–4.
29 Harris, A. Thinking About Education, p. 16–17.
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prises 70 per cent slaves and 30 per cent ruling class. Since they do no
have careers to prepare for, what is necessary for them to learn, what type
of curriculum would be appropriate beyond religious instruction and sport?
Presumably, the priests of this society would need to exercise power over
the slaves, who do not expect to have an after-life because they do not be-
lieve they have souls – life on earth is all they have. It is also assumed that
all the priests are men, and that all the power lies in their hands. As with
any class system, political power lies in the hands of the minority. Why is
indoctrination (rather than education) necessary if such a society is to
preserve its existing structure? Why would real education for the slaves
be undesirable in the eyes of the priests?
As Daveney30 indicates, if one has a very clear notion of the function
of a state, one will also have a pretty clear idea of the education the citi-
zens of the state ought to have. This means that as much as the purpose of
education varies, so does the content of education. For example, in re-
gimes that claim to be democratic but are, in fact, authoritarian, in those
who are ruled there is no need to create »cultural self-understanding con-
sistent with principles underlying governmental authority.«31 In other
words, rules do not aim to be accountable to the public! In such regimes,
identities obtained within family, ethnic, class or religious life are consid-
ered to be sufficient for the production of identities consistent with the
authority of the regime. Since authoritarianism hides relevant informa-
tion and thus prevents citizens from carrying out their duty to make quali-
fied choices, authoritarianism lowers the integrity of the public sphere!
Hence, authoritarianism might be held accountable for, as Wilhelm von
Humboldt notes, attacking the »inner life of the soul, in which the indi-
viduality of human beings essentially consists.«32 Daveney, therefore, as-
serts that the debate about education is, in fact, a debate about society,
and that is why the question of »Education for what?« is virtually unan-
swerable.
According to Harris,33 education in not a subject in any simple sense,
since there is a sharp contrast between the educational ideals of a democ-
racy and those of a totalitarian state. The former – at least in principle –
values freedom of political thinking, whereas the latter values uncritical
91
30 Daveney, T. F. »Education – A Moral Concept«, in: Langford, G. & O’Connor D.
J. (eds.) New Essays in the Philosophy of Education, p. 91.
31 Civic Culture – What It Is, Essay 1: »The Cultural Creation of Citizens«,
http://www.civsoc.com/whatclt1.htm, p. 2.
32 Humboldt, W. Von. The Limits of State Action, p. 7.
33 Harris, A. Thinking about Education, p. 5.
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loyalty and the subservience of individual desires to the welfare of the
»State«.
Conclusion
The debate about the issues within the domain of education refers to
the objectives of teaching and learning, rather than to specific content.
Many contemporary philosophers of education have been confirming
Plato and Aristotle, who claim that the purpose of education is to chal-
lenge students to acquire an independent mind. Only individuals who
gain integrity will be capable of judging what is good and act accordingly
without having to be extrinsically rewarded, or without having to be co-
erced into turning away from whatever is not virtuous. If moral equality
for all persons is recognised (which is the basic moral assumption of de-
mocracy), then the instilment of values in children or students should also
be considered morally unacceptable. Namely, treating humans as means
instead of ends in themselves violates the moral autonomy of individuals.
The aims in education should always be reconsidered, since in a civic cul-
tural system extensive knowledge ought to be accessible to all humans.
Although the concept of training might be valuable as it is an empirical
concept, it seems to be insufficient for a person to become qualified to
make assessments autonomously and analytically. In spite of the fact that
the views on the purpose of education differ widely, the typical reason
why every stratified or class system involves vast indoctrination is the
need to preserve both the political and economic power of the system in
the hands of the few.
References
Aristotle. The Basic Works of Aristotle, R. McKeon (ed. and intro.), New York:
Random House 1968.
Brown, S. C. (ed.) Philosophers Discuss Education, London: The Macmillan Press
Ltd. 1975.
Civic Culture – What It Is, Essay 1: »The Cultural Creation of Citizens«,
http://www.civsoc.com/whatclt1.htm
Cochrane, D. B., Hamm, C. M. & Kazepides A. C. (eds.) The Domain of Moral
Education, New York: Paulist Press Ramsey 1979.
Cornford, F. M. Plato’s Theory of Knowledge – The Theaetetus and the Sophist of
Plato, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. 1951.
92
M. ¬itinski: The Concept of Education METODIÈKI OGLEDI, 12 (2005) 1, 81–94
Foot, P. (ed.) Theories of Ethics, Oxford Readings in Philosophy, Glasgow: Oxford
University Press 1967.
Harris, A. Thinking About Education, London: Heinemann Educational Books
1970.
Hill, T. E. The Concept of Meaning, London: George Allen & Unwin 1974.
Hollins, T. H. B. (ed.) Aims in Education – The Philosophic Approach, Manches-
ter: Manchester University Press 1967.
Langford, G. & O’Connor, D. J. (eds.) New Essays in the Philosophy of Education,
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. 1973.
Lipman, M., Sharp, A. M. & Oscanyan, F. S. Philosophy in the Classroom, pub-
lished for
The Institute For Children, Upper Montclair, New Jersey: Montclair State Col-
lege 1977.
Natale, S. M. Ethics and Morals in Business, Birmingham, Alabama: REP 1983.
Peters, R. S. (ed.) The Concept of Education, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul
1967.
Plato. Laws, translated by T. J. Saunders, Harmondsworth: Penguin 1953.
Rich, J. M. (ed.) Readings in the Philosophy of Education, 2nd Edition, Belmont,
California: Wadsworth Publishing Company Inc. 1972.
Silverman, S. L., Casazza & Martha, E. Learning & Development – Making Con-
nections to Enhance Teaching, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers 1999.
Sternberg, E. Just Business – Business Ethics in Action, 2nd Edition, Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press 2000.
Wilson, J. Preface to the Philosophy of Education, International Library of the Phi-




Pojam obrazovanja podrazumijeva neki standard ili normu koja æe obrazovanju
dati svrhu. Vrijednosni sudovi su u obrazovanju konstitutivni. Veæina rasprava o cilje-
vima obrazovanja se odnosi na razliku meðu pojmovima »educere« (izvoditi), i »edu-
care« (uvje®bavati). Izvoditi, potra®uje odnos prema studentu kao osobi, pri èemu se
smatra kako postati obrazovan znaèi nauèiti biti osoba. Uvje®bavanje ili izobrazba na
studenta gleda kao na objekt koji se treba pribli®iti stereotipu. Za razliku od obra-
zovanja, izobrazba nije logièki povezana s moralnim vrijednostima. Referat preispi-
tuje raznovrsne procedure koje vode prema unutarnjoj vrijednosti samoga znanja.
Ukoliko su u obrazovnoj proceduri autoriteti najva®niji, onda æe studenti morati pri-
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hvaæati one zakljuèke koje æe im autoritet nametnuti i onda kad po naravi stvari takvi
zakljuèci nisu opravdani. Obrazovanje ne odra®ava samo one promjene koje su se u
društvu veæ dogodile, ono treba zauzeti aktivnu ulogu u pronala®enju pravaca društve-
nih promjena. Zbog toga, indoktrinaciju i ostale racionalizacije treba smatrati ne-
moralnim naèinom odnosa prema studentima.
Key words: ekstrinziène i intrinziène vrijednosti, indoktrinacija, odgoj, uèenje, mo-
ralno opravdanje
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